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INTRODUCTION
One to four percent of the world population is intersexed, not fully
male or female.' This biological fact is hard to reconcile with the tradition
B.A. George Washington University; M.F.A. University of Pittsburgh; J.D.
University of Pittsburgh; Clerk to the Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania; Associate, Dechert, LLP. I would like to acknowledge
Jeanette Hahn for first telling me about the hijra and Professor Elena Baylis for sug-
gesting I research intersexed infants in the United States. Professor Baylis, along with
Linda Wharton and Susan Frietsche, also provided insightful comments and edits on
this paper. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss this paper with Professor Nancy
Ehrenreich while she was a visiting instructor at the University of Pittsburgh. An ear-
lier draft of this paper won an Honorable Mention in the University of Pittsburgh
2006 Global Studies Research Symposium.
1. Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 41
(2004).
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
of conferring rights based on what is found below one's belt buckle. The
soundness of the practice of allocating rights on the basis of sex depends
on two concepts. First, that sex is fixed at birth. Second, that everyone
fits neatly into boxes labeled male and female. Today, the prevalence of
intersexed individuals and our increasing ability to alter a person's birth
sex through hormones and surgery reveals the male-female binary as a
social construct. The law has never been equipped to handle intersexed
individuals and this defect in the law is becoming more prevalent with
scientific advances. This Article will examine the human rights abuses
encountered by two minority sexual groups, one in the United States
and one in India, stemming from the collision2 of law, biology, and so-
cietal expectations.
Most Americans cannot conceive of a sexual identity outside the
male-female binary. Therefore, the medical standard of care for inter-
sexed infants in the United States calls for corrective surgery aimed at
"normalizing" external genitalia to fit societal expectations. These proce-
dures are not medically necessary to preserve the child's health. In
addition, the surgeries often occur without the informed consent of the
parent or, in the case of older patients, the child.3 These procedures dis-
proportionately target males, who the medical establishment views as
having inadequate genitals even though they will be able have inter-
course and possibly father children. There is a growing movement to
stop intersexed infant surgery or at least require informed parental con-
sent. While important, focusing on reforming the medical approach to
intersexed infants ignores legal pitfalls, particularly the problems inter-
sexed Americans will face if they try to marry or change identification
documents like birth certificates or drivers' licenses.
In contrast to the United States, India recognizes the possibility of a
third gender because of a visible and long-standing sexual minority
2. I've adopted this metaphor from Julie Greenberg's article. See generally infra note 4.
3. Physicians told one twelve-year old intersexed patient that she had ovarian cancer and
they were going to perform a hysterectomy. Hass, supra note 1, at 42 n.8. In fact, the
patient did not have ovaries but testes that were removed during the surgery. Id. An-
other patient, who had had ten genital surgeries by the age of ten, wrote that "[mly
childhood was filled with pain, surgery, skin grafts, and isolation." Jeff McClintock,
Growing up in the Surgical Maelstrom, 2 Chrysalis: J. of Transgressive Gender Identi-
ties 53, 54 (1997), available at http://www.isna.org/books/chrysalis/mcclintock. Even
though he questioned the purpose of the surgeries, the doctors did not answer his
questions and told him not to complain. Id. Another intersexed patient remembered
the doctors telling her father that the surgery would make her "normal." Morgan
Holmes, Is Growing up in Silence Better Than Growing tp Different?, 2 Chrysalis: J. of
Transgressive Gender Identities 7, 8 (1997, available at http://www.isna.org/node/
743. Nobody told the patient or her father they were going to amputate her clitoris,
but instead "they gave it a much more benign name 'clitoral recession.'" Id.
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group called the hijras. The hijras are composed of intersexed men who
identify as women and other transgendered or transvestite men who act
and dress as women. This recognition may be due to the religious un-
derpinnings of the group and the prominent role that hijras play in
Indian culture. Intersexed hijras only include men who identify as
women-never women who identify as men. Therefore, they are only a
subset of the intersex population. While this subset of the intersex popu-
lation in the United States would most likely undergo "normalizing"
surgery, the hijras never complete the identification as women through
the surgical construction of a vagina. One obvious reason for this is that
the group has a long tradition that predates such complicated surgical
procedures. But more than that, the group identity embraces the
"third"-the space between male and female. The hijras, although his-
torically discriminated against on the basis of laws imported by their
British colonizers, are beginning to gain legal recognition in India when
they self-identify as a third gender.
Part I of this Article defines intersexuality and highlights the legal
and societal complications that occur when the concept of the fixed
male-female gender binary is challenged. Part II describes the unique
role of the hijras in India, who are both revered and discriminated
against, and suggests that India is beginning to legally recognize a third
gender through the grassroots advocacy of the hijras. Part III contrasts
the experience of intersexed individuals in the United States by describ-
ing the current protocol to deal with the "medical emergency" of the
birth of an intersexed child. This section forecasts legal issues facing in-
tersexed individuals who choose to exist as a third gender in
nonconformance to the male-female binary through an examination of
case law on transsexuals in the marriage and employment context. The
conclusion advocates the necessity of statutory reform to ensure that
intersexed individuals receive the benefit of their Constitutionally pro-
tected right to equal treatment.
I. NOT MALE, NOT FEMALE: DEFINING INTERSEXUALITY AND ITS
COLLISION WITH LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIETAL CONSTRUCTS
Before examining specific examples of intersexed individuals in In-
dia and the United States, it is important to define core terms. While we
often conflate sex and gender, they are distinct. Sex identifies men and
women based on biology, while gender is a social construct.' Another
4. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision between
Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 265, 271, 274 (1999).
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way of looking at this is to consider sex as fixed and constant across cul-
ture (unless there are surgical or medical interventions), while gender is
mutable and determined by dress and behavior that identify the indi-
vidual as male or female within the individual's society.
Sex is typically determined at birth by focusing on external genita-
lia.5 This is problematic in two particular cases. The first case is where
the sexual organ is ambiguous because it can be classified as either an
abnormally small penis or a large clitoris.6 The second situation occurs
when genitals do not correspond to chromosomal sex. For example, in-
dividuals with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) have male XY
chromosomes but female external genitalia because of an insensitivity to
androgen, a steroid hormone that directs the development of masculine
sex characteristics.7 In addition to not taking into account chromosomal
makeup (XX for females, XY for males), determining sex by only look-
ing at external sex organs is also an erroneous inquiry because it ignores
other significant biological sex characteristics, including reproductive sex
glands, internal sexual organs, hormones, and secondary sexual features
such as facial hair or breasts.8
When all primary and secondary sex characteristics are considered,
one to four percent of the world's population is estimated to be inter-
sexed.9 This could equal 2.7 million people in the United States alone.'0
To put this figure in context, even if the intersexed population in the
United States was as low as one-tenth of one percent, intersexed indi-
viduals would be as common as people with Down's Syndrome,"
making this a significant subset of the population.
To further complicate sex and gender categories, gender identity is
a distinct concept focused on the individual's self-identification as male
or female, regardless of whether this gender choice matches up with
one's external sex organs and other biological sex markers. 12 Having a
5. Id. at 271-272.
6. Id. at 271-273.
7. Id.; Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. the Cider House
Rules: Transgenders Struggle with the Courts over What Clothing They Are Allowed to
Wear on the Job, Which Restroom They Are Allowed to Use on the Job, Their Right to
Marry, and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 169
(2000).
8. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 278.
9. Haas, supra note 1, at 41. For a fuller discussion of the wide variety of intersex condi-
tions, see Greenberg, supra note 4, at 281-292.
10. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 267.
11. Frye, supra note 7, at 168.
12. See INTL GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, SEXUAL MINORITIES AND THE
WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONAL SPEcIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE 2 (2001),
available at http://www.iglhrc.org/files/iglhrc/reports/torturereport.pdf ("[Tlhe
[Vol. 14:223
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gender identity that differs from your biological sex could lead an indi-
vidual to become a transvestite (temporarily perform the gender of the
opposite sex through dress and behavior), a transsexual (permanently
change your biological sex through medical intervention), or self-classify
as a third gender (a refusal to identify exclusively as male or female).
Of these three choices, desiring to live as a third gender is generally
more disconcerting to society than either transvestitism or transsexual-
ism because it challenges the male-female binary. Questioning the male-
female binary shakes the foundation of societal values that depend on
this binary, such as compulsive heterosexuality and the nuclear family.
With the distinctions of sex, gender, and gender identity in mind, we
can begin to examine how historical and current societal practices in the
United States and India cope with intersexed individuals who challenge
the male-female binary.
II. INDIA: ACCEPTANCE OF A THIRD GENDER
A. Hijras: India's Third Gendered People
In India, the hijra (pronounced HIJ-ra) community has existed for
more than four thousand years 3 and is currently believed to number
half a million. 4 The word "hijra" designates an alternative gender to the
male-female binary; the term translates as eunuch
5 or hermaphrodite. 6
The hijras' base their group's third gender identity on an episode in the
Ramayana where Rama is banished. In the story, Rama tells a tearful
group of men and women, lamenting his banishment, to leave and re-
turn to the city. A group of people "who were not men and not women"
people we call 'transgender' share a particular experience of their own selves as gen-
dered: a sense that their psychological gender is different from that to which they
were assigned at birth.").
13. PEOPLES' UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, KARNATAKA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AGAINST THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 17 (2003), available at http://
ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/PUCL/PUCL%20Report.pdf [hereinafter PUCL
REPORT].
14. Paul Watson, Offering India's Voters a Unique Perspective, Los ANGELES TIMES, May
9, 2004 at A3; Eunuchs and Homosexuals Protest for Basic Rights in Bangalore, HINDU-
STAN TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006.
15. Indian society seems to use the terms eunuch and hijra interchangeably, even though
hijras do not prefer the term eunuch. See infra Part II(C) for a criticism of the "E" for
eunuch designation. In this paper, I have only used eunuch when the original source
utilizes this word.
16. SERENA NANDA, NEITHER MAN NOR WOMAN: THE HIJRAs OF INDIA 13 (2nd. ed.
1999).
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did not know what to do and remained with him." Rama rewarded the
hijras for their loyalty by giving them the power to bless auspicious oc-
casions such as marriage and childbirth through customary singing and
dancing known as badhai.
18
Irregular male sex organs are central to the group's definition." The
hijras include both ceremonially emasculated males and intersexed peo-
ple whose genitals are "ambiguously male-like at birth., 20 Unlike the
intersexed population in the United States, all hijras have a female gen-
der identity. There are no ambiguous females who identify as males in
the group. Instead, all hijras dress and act as women even though they
are not biological women, nor are they surgically altered to have vaginas
like many intersexed people in America.2'
Although one might label the hijras as transvestites, especially those
who are not born intersexed, Serena Nanda, the only anthropologist
who has studied the group extensively, uncovered elements of both a
female and male group identity.22 The hijra are "not men" because of
their imperfect or absent penis.23 In fact, when Nanda would ask "What
is a hijra?," the hijra would lift her skirt and point to her ambiguous or
mutilated genitals. 24 Other components of the hijra definition as "not
male" include: not having the same sexual feelings as men do (e.g. sexual
desire for women), walking like women, taking female names, and wear-
ing female clothing, jewelry, and bindi. 25 However, even if hijras are like
women in terms of their dress and mannerisms, it is clear that they are
also not women. Nanda classifies their female behavior as burlesque-
dancing, smoking, and acting in sexually explicit ways, all things falling
outside of the traditional female role in Indian society.26 Hijras also work
17. Id. at 13; see also PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 17-18 (describing alternative
origin myths for the hijras).
18. PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 18.
19. NANDA, supra note 16, at 14.
20. Id. at 14.
21. See generally id.
22. See generally id. Coincidentally, John Money, the American creator of gender normal-
izing surgeries discussed at length infra in Part III(A) of this Article, wrote a forward
to the first edition of Nanda's book. In his forward, he does not advocate labeling the
hijra as a third gender and discounts their identity as hermaphrodites. Instead, he de-
fines them as "women-mimetics" or acting like women. John Money, Forward to the
First Edition of SERENA NANDA, NEITHER MAN NOR WOMAN: THE HijRAs OF INDIA,
at xi, xii (1st ed. 1990). This forward seems to conflict with Nanda's definition of hi-
jras as an alternative gender.
23. NANDA, supra note 16, at 15.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 18.
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in male occupations such as construction) 7 Finally, hijras do not have
female reproductive organs and are not able to have children.28
How does Indian society cope with the hijras' choice to embrace a
third gender identity as "not men and not women"? The evidence is
mixed, although it does seem that the hijras have been accepted to a
higher degree than their American intersexed counterparts. Nanda seems
to say that while the hijras are accepted, they are also ostracized. The
hijra identity is "deeply rooted" in Indian culture and the Hindu belief
that all people contain male and female attributes. 2 The hijras also play
a sanctioned role in Hindu society through the practice of badhai-a
contradictory ritual where infertile hijras bless births and marriages."
However, Nanda notes that the status of hijras as "neither man nor
woman, call into question the basic social categories of gender on which
Indian society is built. This makes hijras objects of fear, abuse, ridicule,
and sometimes pity.""1 Attitudes toward the hijras are also colored by the
fact that many work as prostitutes because societal discrimination makes
it difficult for hijras to find appropriate employment. 2
B. English Colonization Began an Era of
State-Sanctioned Discrimination
British colonization of India in the mid 1850s began an era of sys-
temic state-sanctioned discrimination for the hijras 3 The primary
instruments of this discrimination were laws including: (1) the Criminal
Tribes Act of 1871: An Act for the Registration of Criminal Tribes and
Eunuch; and (2) Section 377 of the Penal Code, which criminalized
non-procreative sexual acts.34
The Criminal Tribes Act required all members of criminal tribes to
register with the authorities, operating under the assumption, common
to India's caste system, that all members of certain communities were
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 19-21.
30. Id. at 1-3.
31. Id. at23.
32. PEOPLES' UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, KARNATAKA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AGAINST SEXUAL MINORITIES IN INDIA 32 (2001), available at http://pucI.org/
Topics/Gender/2003/sexual-minorities.pdf [hereinafter PUCL HR REPORT].
33. See Joseph T. Bockrath, Bhartia Hijro Ka Dharma: The Code of India's Hijra, 27
LEGAL STUD. F. 83, 87-88 (2003).
34. Id.; see also PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 43-48.
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criminal and unclean from birth. 35 Article 26 of the act specifically tar-
geted hijra practice by providing:
Any eunuch so registered who appears, dressed or ornamented
like a woman, in a public street or place, or in any other place,
with the intention of being seen from a public street or place,
or who dances or plays music, or takes part in any public ex-
hibition, in a public street or place or for hire in a private
house may be arrested without warrant, and shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.36
By forbidding the hijras to dress as women and perform in the
street, the act effectively criminalized the group's entire identity.3 7 Addi-
tionally, Article 29 of the act further eroded the legal identity of the
group by prohibiting hijras from making a gift or a will.3 Although now
repealed, this historical act encouraged the "contemporary perception of
hijras as thieves as well as the brutal violence which is inflicted against
them.
39
Another colonial remnant, Section 377 of the Penal Code, is still
on the books, even though Britain and other former British colonies
such as South Africa have repealed similar laws.4° This law criminalizes
even consensual homosexual contact and case law has broadened the
interpretation of the act's prohibition on "carnal intercourse" to include
oral sex, anal sex, and thigh sex; "[b]asically any form of sex which does
not result in procreation comes within the rubric of Sec[tion] 377. ' 4 As
hijras by definition are men-or at least not biological women-who
have sex with men, Section 377 can be used to criminalize their consen-
sual sexual expression. As many hijras make a living through
prostitution, they are particularly susceptible to prosecution under this
law. In practice, the law is used "to targer, harass, and punish lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender persons." 2 One police tactic is to physi-
35. PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 44.
36. Act No. XXVII of 1871, reprinted in Bockrath, supra note 33, at 88.
37. See id. at 87 n.29; cf Shunned by the Majority, HINDUSTAN TIMES, May 20, 2006
(describing how the Criminal Tribes Act transformed the hijras into a "condemned"
and "intensely secretive" community).
38. Bockrath, supra note 33, at 88 n.30.
39. PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 46.
40. PUCL HR REPORT, supra note 32, at 11; Change Laws to Protect Rights of Sexual
Minorities, THE HINDU, Oct. 24, 2004.
41. PUCL REPORT, supra note at 13, at 47.
42. U.S. STATE DEP'T BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, INDIA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICEs-2004, § 5 (2005), available at
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cally attack, rape, or blackmail this group of people and use the threat of
prosecution under Section 377 to make sure the victim does not report
their crimes to other authorities.43 Although there are no cases using Sec-
tion 377 to prosecute consensual sex, the continued existence of this law
on the books stigmatizes the gay and transgendered community and
forces them to keep silent about human rights abuses perpetrated by the
police." The government continues to support the law and has stated
that "public opinion and the current societal context in India does not
favor the deletion" of Section 377 and the Delhi High Court has dis-
missed a legal challenge."
Aside from the potential criminal sanctions imposed by Section
377 and the historic criminalization of the hijra identity perpetrated by
the Criminal Tribes Act, the hijras are further marginalized by India's
policy of only recognizing two sexes on official identity papers.46 These
identity cards require citizens to identify as male or female, and not as a




Furthermore, India does not recognize sex changes on identity cards,
which makes it impossible for an intersexed or male hijra to choose a
legal female identity.48 This policy has the effect of denying hijras nu-
merous rights contingent upon the state identity card including "the
right to vote, the right to own property, the right to marry, the right to
claim a formal identity through a passport and a ration card, a driver's
license, the right to education, employment, health so on., 49 India's
laws50 and policies, derived from colonial law, have criminalized the hijra
status.
http://www.state.govlg/drllrls/hrrptl200 4 /4 1740.htm [hereinafter STATE DEPT.
REPORT 2004].
43. Id.
44. See PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 48.
45. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, INDIA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-200 6 § 5 (2007), available at
http://www.state.govlgldrl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78871.htm [hereinafter STATE DEPT. RE-
PORT 2006].
46. PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 50. India is not alone in this respect, as most other
countries discriminate in this manner.
47. Id. at 51.
48. Id. But see infra text accompanying note 63.
49. Id. at 50-51.
50. While the Indian Constitution has an equal protection clause that prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex, this guarantee has not barred the State's discriminatory
practices, possibly because the equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. For example, in the
electoral context, one writer has noted that the hijras have been excluded from the
polls in spite of the equal protection guarantee because even if there had not been a
blanket ban on participation, "most [hijras] were overlooked in the counting," or had
2008]
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C. An End to Discrimination?Allowing Se/f-Identification
and Recognition ofa Third Gender
The political landscape in India is changing. Due in large part to
non-governmental advocacy groups, there is growing recognition of the
discrimination endured by the hijras. The Indian National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC), established by the Human Rights Act of
1993,51 serves the purpose of investigating human rights abuses through
research, intervening in human rights proceedings, reviewing the Con-
stitution and implementing measures to safeguard constitutional
rights.52 While laudable, the NHRC's attention is not focused on hijras.
The NHRC website does not mention hijras anywhere-hijras are no-
ticeably absent in the index of human rights cases and human rights
issues.53 In fact, the NHRC has stated that "gay and lesbian rights [are]
not under its purview", suggesting that it will not act on behalf of hi-
jras, as the group is often considered in conjunction with the gay rights
movement.
Advocacy that is not being done by the NHRC is being undertaken
by NGOs and hijras themselves. First, NGOs are campaigning for the
repeal of Section 377.55 Second, hijra candidates are running for local,
state, and national elections now that they are listed on the electoral
rolls.56 Hijras have formed their own political party, Jiti Jitai (translated
as "We Have Already Won", which references the "sexual mystique" they
wield); six hijras recently won local and state elections and four eunuch
candidates ran in the 2004 election.57 Based on their own experiences of
discrimination, the hijras' platform champions the rights of India's other
to identify as male "against their wishes" in order to exercise their rights, or "were too
embarrassed to go to the voting booths where derisive questions would be raised
about their sexual identity." M, F, E or More?, THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 12, 2005.
51. See Nat'l Human Rights Comm'n New Delhi, India http://nhrc.nic.in/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Nat'l Human Rights Comm'n].
52. See Nat'l Human Rights Comm'n New Delhi, India, The Protection of Human
Rights Act, 1993, chp. III sec. 12, available at http://nhrc.nic.in/.
53. See Nat'l Human Rights Comm'n, supra note 51.
54. STATE DEPT. REPORT 2004, supra note 42, § 5.
55. Change Laws to Protect Rights of Sexual Minorities, supra note 40; Eunuchs and Homo-
sexuals Protest for Basic Rights in Bangalore, supra note 14; IPC Section Biased Against
Sexual Minorities, THE HINDU, Dec. 17, 2003; Repeal IPC Section 377, Urge Sexual-
ity Minorities, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006. The hijras have been joined in this
effort by other human rights activists in a "high-profile campaign to overturn Section
377." STATE DEP. RFPORT 2006, supra note 45, § 5.
56. M, F, E orMore?, supra note 50.
57. Watson, supra note 14.
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poor and exploited citizens. 8 However, two elections initially won by
hijras have been nullified by courts who ruled that the candidates were
men and could not therefore take posts that were reserved for women.59
Judicial decisions such as these could have a detrimental impact on the
hijras' ability to gain political office in order to publicize and ameliorate
the discrimination they and other minorities face. While there is a need
within Indian society to reserve posts for women, hijras should be con-
sidered for similar political treatment or be permitted to take a small
percentage of these posts, as it is doubtful that they will be elected in
large enough numbers to dilute female representation in government.
Finally, the hijra identity is being recognized in an unexpected loca-
tion: on Indian passports. As an alternative to choosing to identify as
male or female, hijras now have the option of writing "E" for eunuch. 0
This first step in state recognition is probably connected to the advocacy
efforts described above and hijras leaving their insular community to
serve in elected office. The "E" designation is noteworthy because it al-
lows the individual to self-identify outside the male-female binary. The
passport application does not require detailed proof to request the "E"
status; it is as simple as checking the box. Advocates applaud the "E"
designation and say that it will make travel easier, as hijras will no longer
have to dress as men if they leave the country in order to match the
gender identity on their passports.6' Others are critical of the use of the
word eunuch, preferring the broader term of "transgender," which in-
cludes transsexuals and intersexed.62 Concurrent with the creation of the
"E" option, the Ministry of External Affairs is allowing individuals to
change the sex on their passport with a sworn affidavit and medical cer-
tification.63
The "E" designation suggests that India has a broader view of gen-
der beyond the male-female binary. An "E" or third gender identity
option on the passport is an important first step in state recognition of
the hijra identity and should be applied to other state forms of identifi-
cation to ensure inclusion. This first step shows a recognition of a third
gender identity that is absent in the United States, particularly at the
58. Id.
59. PUCL REPORT, supra note 13, at 51. Unlike in the United States, it is a common
practice for other governments, particularly in emerging democracies that use a par-
liamentary system, to exclusively reserve select positions for certain minorities, such as
women.
60. Passport Information Booklet 2, available at http://www.and.nic.in/passport.pdf.
61. Shibu Thomas, Column for Eunuchs in Passport Form, MID-DAY MUMBIA, Mar. 9,
2005.
62. Bhattacharya, supra note 60.
63. Passport Information Booklet, supra note 60, at 11.
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federal level, where recent marriage and identification legislation man-
dates classification as male or female. 6
III. UNITED STATES: OBSTACLES TO THE LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF A THIRD GENDER
A. Intersex Surgery in the United States
In the United States, prior to the 1930s, society placed intersexed
individuals in the male-female binary according to their dominant
physical characteristics." Starting in the 1930s, the medical community
began "treating" intersexed individuals with hormones and surgical pro-
66cedures to turn them into "normal" women and men. However, while
doctors assigned infants to a sex at birth, they waited until puberty be-
fore treating the intersexed individual. 7 It was not until the 1950s,
when physicians could identify intersex conditions at birth, that Dr.
John Money, a professor and researcher at Johns Hopkins University,
established the current standard of care: genital reconstructive surgery as
close to birth as possible.68 In contrast to the previous model where doc-
tors waited to intervene until puberty, Money's theory posits that
intersex is a social and medical emergency to be treated immediately.
69
Two primary theories underlie Money's medical protocol. First, by plac-
ing nurture over nature, he theorized, "children are not born with a
gender identity, but rather form an understanding of gender through
their social upbringing., 70 Therefore, the earlier the surgical interven-
tion, the better chance that the child would conform to his or her
assigned gender upbringing. Second, Money surmised, "the only way to
ensure that both the family and the child would accept the child's gen-
64. See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (establishing a federal definition of
marriage as between a man and woman); REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119
Stat. 231 (2005) (requiring that state-issued driver's licenses and identification cards
identify a person's gender). The Defense of Marriage Act assumes the existence of
two sexes by limiting marriage to between a man and a woman. Both acts also implic-
itly assume that every person falls into a categorical box labeled male or female.
65. Haas, supra note 1, at 44.
66. Id. (use of quoted terms (treatment and normal) in the original). I use quotations
once to convey Haas' questioning of these terms but will not carry this convention
through the rest of the paper.
67. Erin Lloyd, Symposium Report: Intersex Education, Advocacy & The Law: The Struggle
for Recognition and Protection, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 283, 291 (2005).
68. Haas, supra note 1, at 45.
69. Lloyd, supra note 67, at 291.
70. Haas, supra note 1, at 45.
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der was if the child's genitals looked clearly male or female.",71 Put in
other words, Money's theory boils down to the belief that children could
develop either male or female gender identities "if you made their bodies
look right ... and made them and their parents believe the gender as-
signment.
72
In 1972, Money publicized his theory of gender reconstructive sur-
gery, trumpeting the case of Bruce Reimer as a great success. 73 This case
is frequently referred to as the "John/Joan" case.74 John was not inter-
sexed but a male identical twin whose penis was seriously burned during
a circumcision procedure when he was eight months old.75 Fearing their
son would be considered defective without a penis, his parents con-
sented to genital reassignment surgery at the advice of Dr. Money.
76
John was turned into Joan by surgically removing his penis and creating
a vagina from his scrotum.77 The doctors also removed John's internal
male reproductive organs and prescribed female hormones at the onset
of puberty to begin breast development and other female characteris-
tics.
7 s
However, the John/Joan case was anything but the success Dr.
Money claimed it to be. Family and friends observed that Joan acted as a
tomboy and did not fit in socially as a girl. 79 At fourteen, John rejected
his assigned gender of Joan and began living as a boy.0 Subsequently, he
had surgeries to reduce breast growth and construct a penis. He "later
married a woman and adopted her three children."" l However, David
Reimer-the name John adopted when he re-identified as a male-
committed suicide in 2004, a death that his family attributes to a life-
long depression caused by his incorrect gender assignment.8 2
71. Id. at 46
72. Intersex Society of North America, What's Wrong with the Way Intersex Has Tradi-
tionally Been Treated?, http://www.isna.org/faq/concealment.
73. Haas, supra note 1, at 45.
74. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genita-
lia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2000).
75. Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the
Selective Condemnation of "Cultural Practices', 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 71, 102
(2005).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 103.
78. Haas, supra note 1, at 45.
79. Beh & Diamond, supra note 74, at 10 (noting that Joan refused girl toys, activities,
clothes, and was caught urinating standing up and trying to use the boy's bathroom).
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id. at 11-12.
82. REPORT OF A PUBLIC HEARING BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF THE CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, A HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION INTO THE
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The John/Joan case is strong evidence against Money's theory that
children can successfully be raised in any gender identity. Although the
supposed success of John's reassignment was widely disseminated, the
rejection of John's assigned female gender was not." The general medical
establishment continues to assume the validity of Money's model and its
theoretical underpinnings. Moreover, other countries have adopted the
United States model. 84 Despite the prevalence of the practice, "there is
no research showing that intersexuals benefit psychologically from the
surgery performed on them as infants and toddlers .... [And n]o fol-
low-up studies were ever done .. ,,85 There is insufficient empirical
support for gender-normalizing surgery 6 which is beginning to be ques-
tioned by advocates, including intersexed Americans."
Even though physicians are aware that gender reassignment surgery
is not based on sound medical research and that there are further con-
cerns about consent to the procedure, which will be discussed below, the
surgical approach promulgated by Dr. Money remains the standard of
care.88 The Intersex Society of Northern America estimates that one or
two of every thousand live births are followed by surgical alteration of
the genital organs."' Kate Haas posits that five children are subjected to
genital surgery every day in the United States.9 Reconstruction of geni-
tal organs so they match societal expectations is not simple. Intersexed
children undergo an average of three to five operations and some un-
dergo more than twenty. While many of the procedures occur within the
first six months of a child's life, they can persist into puberty." It is no
MEDICAL "NORMAIzATION" OF INTERSEX PEOPLE, 46-47 (Apr. 28, 2005) available
at http://www.isna.org/files/SFHRCIntersex-Report.pdf [hereinafter SF HRC RE-
PORT].
83. Beh & Diamond, supra note 74, at 10.
84. Haas, supra note 1, at 46.
85. Id.
86. Kishka-Kamari Ford, "First, Do No Harm"-The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent to
Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 469, 482
(2001).
87. See generally SF HRC REPORT, supra note 82, at 17; Intersex Society of North Amer-
ica, http://www.isna.org/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2007); Intersex Initiative, http://
www.intersexinitiative.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
88. Intersex Society of North America, What Do Doctors Do Now When they Encounter a
Patient with Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/standard-of care (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
89. Intersex Society of North America, How Common is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/
faq/frequency (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) (containing more detailed statistics, includ-
ing an estimate that one in every 100 children differs in some way from the normal
male or female).
90. Haas, supra note 1, at 41.
91. Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 75, at 105.
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wonder that intersexed children begin to feel like lab rats, particularly as
the surgeries are accompanied by a humiliating focus on their genital
organs, which are continually manipulated and inspected. 2 Surgically
altering intersexed individuals at birth can prohibit self-identification as
a different gender at a later age, denying the person the ability to un-
dergo further surgery to match his or her biological sex with gender
identity and receiving full societal recognition. 3
More troubling is the fact that intersex surgery is targeted at non-
conforming males. Ehrenreich notes that ninety percent of intersex
surgery "is aimed at changing the intersex child into a girl."' 4 The
John/Joan case is an example of this type of intersex surgery. Alice
Domurat Dreger notes some of the medical rationales for this phe-
nomenon, all of which link back to preserving patriarchal gender roles:
[S]urgeons seem to demand far more for a penis to count as
'successful' than for a vagina to count as such. Indeed, the
logic behind the tendency to assign the female gender in cases
of intersexuality rests not only on the belief that boys need
'adequate' penises, but also upon the opinion among surgeons
that a 'functional vagina can be constructed in virtually every-
one [while] a functional penis is a much more difficult goal.'
This is true because much is expected of penises, especially by
pediatric urologists, and very little of vaginas."
This is exactly the rationale that Dr. Money used to convince
John/Joan's parents that the only appropriate medical and social re-
sponse to John's damaged penis was to surgically change him into Joan.
Dreger notes that the high standards that doctors, including Money,
seem to set for male sexual adequacy are contradicted by other research
that shows "any penis is a big enough penis for male adjustment."
96
Another reason why most intersex surgeries are aimed at producing
women is based on a sexist reproduction rationale. Dreger notes that
doctors are more concerned with preserving the fertility of those born
with ovaries as opposed to testes, even though some men with micro-
penises will be able to father children. 97 Accordingly, babies who lack a Y
92. Id. at 107.
93. Id. at 113.
94. Id. at 125-126.
95. Alice Domurat Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex"--or Ambivalent Medicine?, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., May-June 1998, at 24, 29 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at25, 29.
97. Id. at 28.
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chromosome are always declared girls to conserve their fertility and are
surgically altered to fit that role.98
Intersex surgery in the United State is barbaric in practice, aimed at
nonconforming men, and without empirical support that the procedure
is necessary for the psychological health of intersexed people. Com-
pounding these problems, there is a growing realization that parental
consent to these life-altering procedures is inadequate. Dreger terms the
United States medical protocol as "monster ethics," stating that doctors
ignore "ethical guidelines that would be applied in nearly any other
medical situation .... Patients are lied to; risky procedures are per-
formed without follow-up; consent is not fully informed; autonomy and
health are risked because of unproven (and even disproven) fears that
atypical anatomy will lead to psychological disaster."'9 Clinicians view
the birth of an intersexed child as a medical emergency, urging parents
to surgically establish a sex to rear the child in even though "the intersex
state is typically not life threatening."' 00 In short, the protocol followed
in the John/Joan case is still being used today.
The Constitutional Court in Colombia is the only court in the
world to have considered consent standards for gender reconstructive
surgery in light of the country's constitution and international norms.10'
The court's analysis questions the model of medical secrecy followed in
Colombia, the United States, and throughout the world. Initially, the
court found that an intersex surgery violated a "fundamental right to
human dignity and gender identity" and requiring the patient's own in-
formed consent. 11 2 The court later limited this holding, allowing for
informed written parental consent for patients under five, after the par-
ents had received detailed information, including pros and cons of the
procedure, and time to consider the options. '°3
Haas argues that Colombia's heightened informed consent model
should be adopted in the United States.0 4 Certainly, fully informed con-
sent and other alternatives like assigning and raising a child in one
gender without surgical intervention should be considered.'0 ' While a
98. Id.
99. Id. at 33.
100. Beh & Diamond, supra note 74, at 43-44.
101. Haas, supra note 1, at 49-50. For a detailed discussion of the court's decisions, see id.
at 50-55.
102. Id. at 4 9-50.
103. Id. at 52-54.
104. See id. at 6 1- 6 4 .
105. Intersex Society of North America, What Does ISNA Recommend for Children with
Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/patient-centered (last visited Sept. 28, 2007)
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step in the right direction to end barbaric United States practices, focus-
ing on genital corrective surgery keeps us trapped in the gender binary.
Ehrenreich acknowledges this when she attempts to discount the "cor-
rective" rationale behind intersex surgery, finding that:
[o]nly in a society in which sex is understood in binary terms
(everyone is either male or female) does the hermaphroditic
body become abnormal. Rather than conceptualizing such in-
dividuals as a 'normal' third sex or as occupying various points
along a sex continuum, our society chooses to see them as suf-
fering abnormalities that require repair.' 6
Ehrenreich stops short of advocating that society recognize inter-
sexed individuals as a third sex. ' 7 Although radical, such an approach is
necessary to address the collision between law and biology. The next
section of the Article addresses legal classifications based on sex, specifi-
cally marriage and employment discrimination, that depend on a fixed
binary. Intersexed individuals-the third gender--challenge this as-
sumption and will have difficulty fitting into these legal classifications,
especially if they try to change their sex later in life like David Reimer in
the John/Joan case did. If the sex of an intersexed person is challenged in
court, our legal framework must recognize both biological complexity
and the individuals' self-identity. We must look beyond genital surgery
to ensure intersexed individuals do not suffer human rights abuses.
B. Problematic Legal Recognition of Transsexuals
and Intersexed Individuals
Our history has shown the fallacy in using binary classifications as a
proxy for individual rights. First, Brown v. Board of Education 8 began
the process of eradicating the "separate but equal" architecture that di-
vided blacks and whites on the basis of race. The next binary to be
questioned was sex.'0 9 Now, the male-female binary is under further
("Newborns with intersex should be given a gender assignment as a boy or girl ....
Note that gender assignment does not involve surgery.) (emphasis in original).
106. Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 75, at 117-118.
107. Id. at 130.
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that statutory classifications that
distinguish between males and females are subject to equal protection clause scrutiny,
must serve important governmental objectives, and be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives).
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challenge and our understanding of sex and gender must be expanded to
include homosexual, transgendered, and intersexed individuals.
Protection for sexual minorities is emergent at best." 0 As recently as
the 1970s, homosexuals faced blatant discrimination at their jobs and in
their family lives, where courts refused to recognize same-sex marriages
or extend child custody and visitation to same-sex partners.1" Homo-
sexuals have greater constitutional protection today.112  However,
protection varies greatly on the local level and one commentator has
noted that "comprehensive equality [is] a yet unattained goal."
13
Emerging protection of homosexual conduct has slowly and incon-
sistently extended to groups like transsexuals and the intersexed."' One
court has explicitly said that intersexed is not a suspect class for Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection purposes."5 Homosexuals generally
110. See Susan J. Becker, Many Are Chilled, But Few Are Frozen: How Transformative
Learning in Popular Culture, Christianity, and Science Will Lead to the Eventual De-
mise of Legally Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the United
States, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 177, 182-86 (2006).
111. Id. at 182-83.
112. Greater protection of homosexuals can be seen in all facets of the law. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (invalidating a Texas state law criminalizing sexual
acts between same sex partners, reasoning that "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (stating that a "'bare... desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government in-
terest'" for equal protection purposes and using this reasoning to invalidate a state
constitutional amendment that would exclude gays and lesbians from protection un-
der the state's antidiscrimination law) (quoting Dep't of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973). Also, Price Waterhouse and Oncale, discussed infra Part III(B)(2),
have broadened protection for homosexuals who face employment discrimination. In
family law, some states have begun to recognize same sex unions and sexually minori-
ties are no longer automatically ruled unfit for child visitation and custody rights.
Becker, supra note 110, at 184.
113. Becker, supra note 110, at 185.
114. As early as the 1970s, Mary Dunlap noted that the law's insistence on classifying all
individuals as male or female would disadvantage sexual minorities, who she defined
as homosexuals, transsexuals, and "other persons of nontraditional sexual identifica-
tions." Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1131 n.4 (1978). Furthermore, she
predicted that nonconforming sexual minorities would experience legal coercions to-
ward conformity in the realms of family law, education, and employment. Id. at
1131-35.
115. DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195-97 (D. Wyo. 2004)
(denying an intersexual's Eight Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection claims for being placed in solitary confinement due to her intersex status
while recognizing a due process claim "[clonsidering Plaintiff was only placed in seg-
regated confinement due to a genetically created ambiguous gender and the [prison]
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live within the male-female binary, even though they challenge tradi-
tional heterosexual assumptions about male and female roles. On the
other hand, transsexuals and the intersexed challenge the male-female
binary head on-by seeking to either transition from one sex to another
or by not fully expressing one biological sex.
Looking at how courts classify transsexuals in the gender binary is
arguably a good predictor of how courts will address an intersexed indi-
vidual who challenges that binary.' 16 Even if definitively born into one
sex, transsexuals join the intersexed in the space "in between" male and
female when they are transitioning from one sex to another. Courts have
been asked to classify transsexual plaintiffs who are very similar to a
would-be intersexed plaintiff. For example, some transsexual plaintiffs
seeking the protection of Title VII have male external genitalia but take
female hormones and dress and behave as women."' Transsexualism and
intersexed conditions exist on a continuum and may be more closely
related than previously considered."'
had plenty of time to develop other more respectable less harsh alternatives for Plain-
tiff").
116. Even though the primary focus of the analysis in this Article is on intersexed, because
there is very little case law on the rights of intersexed, the Article will also look at
cases involving transsexuals to examine how and if the law permits an individual to
discard birth sex and self-identify as male or female. Acknowledging that transsexuals
do not make a perfect analogy (unlike intersexed, many transsexuals have a definitive
birth sex) transsexuals do challenge the expectation that sex is fixed at birth. More-
over, intersexed individuals may want to change their sex, as David Reimer in the
John/Joan case did, if they do not identify with their assigned gender. Haas argues
that intersexed individuals prior to genital reconstruction surgery are in a better posi-
tion to obtain court-recognition of their self-identified sex because they have "unclear
genitals," citing one case where an intersexed plaintiff succeeded in altering his birth
certificate. Haas, supra note 1, at 60-61 n.197. Given societal attitudes and legal
precedent viewing gender as fixed and binary, one case does not establish a rule that
all courts will acknowledge an intersexed individual's self-identity.
117. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634
(D. Utah June 24, 2005); see also Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996,
1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (noting that it was unclear factually whether the plaintiffs
sex was ambiguous because of an intersexed condition or as a result of medical at-
tempts to transform from a male to a female).
118. See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 n.5 (D. D.C. 2006) ("If, as some
believe, sexual identity is produced in significant part by hormonal influences on the
developing brain in utero, this would place transsexuals on a continuum with other
intersex conditions such as [androgen insensitivity syndrome], in which the various
components that produce sexual identity and anatomical sex do not align."); Kastl v.
Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29825,
*7 n.5 (D. Ariz., June 2, 2004) ("[D]esignation as a biological female and possession
of male genitalia are not mutually exclusive states .... Medical evidence suggests that
the appearance of genitals at birth is not always consistent with other indicators of
sex."); Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 n. 5.
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Sex classification is legally relevant when amending identifying
documents like birth certificates and driver's licenses' and when seek-
ing equal treatment in employment, marriage, and, less commonly,
professional competitive sports. 12 This Article will focus on marriage
and employment, as these are the most common areas in which the re-
quirement of a male-female binary classification have been challenged.
United States courts have been unwilling to grant affirmative rights to
homosexuals and transsexuals when the right to marry is at issue. Indi-
viduals who do not conform to the fixed gender binary have been more
successful when confronting discrimination at work. Employment dis-
crimination cases brought under Title VII show that courts are
increasingly willing to recognize diversity beyond the gender binary.
1. Marriage
The right to marry is constitutionally protected.12 1 Marriage is the
gateway to other rights, including spousal support, inheritance, immi-
gration benefits, and survivorship rights. The right to marriage has not
been extended to same-sex couples under the federal constitution.12
Only a handful of states recognize same-sex civil unions or marriages
statutorily or under their state constitutions.'23
119. See ISNA website for concerns about the newly enacted REAL ID Act of 2005, 109
H.R. 418, (2005), which requires uniform machine-readable identification across
states where gender is categorized by birth certificate, even if this does not match up
with an individual's self-identified gender. Alice Dreger, Real ID Act and Intersex
Families, http://www.isna.org/news/realID (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
120. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a
Kansas court may give little or no weight to a Wisconsin birth certificate amended to
reflect a sex change).
121. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967). Yet the fundamental right to marry is balanced against a state interest in
regulating marriage through procedural requirements that prohibit categories of peo-
ple from marrying, such as homosexuals and close family members.
122. Several of the Justices considered the effect of the Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), decision on same-sex marriage. Justice O'Connor, concurring in judgment
under an Equal Protection rational basis review, argued that Lawrence could not be
used to strike down the same-sex marriage prohibition because the state had a legiti-
mate interest in promoting opposite-sex marriage. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia criticized Justice O'Connor's reasoning,
calling her argument conclusory and based on the state's moral disapproval of gay
marriage. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), gave same-sex couples the right to marry
under the state constitution's equal protection clause; however, a subsequent consti-
tutional amendment took this right away. See HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAw. Rav.
STAT. § 572C-2 (2005). In Massachusetts, same-sex couples were granted access to
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If most states define marriage as being between one man and one
woman, how do courts determine who qualifies as male and female
when a transsexual or intersexed individual wants to marry? While there
are no reported decisions of litigated intersexed marriages, there are
some cases on transsexual marriage. 12 Even though nearly half of all
states allow transsexuals to legally change their birth sex on birth certifi-
cates and other state-issued identification, after sex reassignment
surgery,2 this is no guarantee that the self-identified sex will control if
the marriage is later challenged.
1 26
So, how do courts decide? In the vast majority of cases, courts reject
self-identified sex and rely on biology, which is viewed as objective and
fixed.12 Littleton v. Prange128 is just such an example. In Littleton, the
court ruled that a male-to-female transsexual could not bring a wrongful
death claim as a surviving spouse because her marriage to a male was an
invalid same-sex relationship. In reaching the judgment, the court
looked at the plaintiff's birth certificate and concluded her marriage was
void and conferred no legal benefits because she "was created and born a
marry under the state equal protection clause. Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). In Vermont, same-sex couples can now enter into
civil unions through a state statutory right. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
Most recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that denying commit-
ted gay partners the right to marry violated the state constitution's equal protection
clause and ordered the state legislature to allow committed gay couples to marry or
enact a statutory scheme providing similar benefits to marriage. Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). Connecticut also has a state domestic partnership law, which
confers benefits similar to marriage. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38aa (2005). Califor-
nia, the District of Columbia, and Maine have similar laws. California passed
"Domestic Partnership Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003," CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 297 (2004). The District of Columbia protected against discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, gender identity, or expression by passing the "Domestic Part-
nership Protection Amendment Act of 2004." D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01. Maine
also provides for domestic partnerships. 22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 2710.
124. For a recent survey of these cases, see Katie D. Fletcher, In re Marriage of Simmons: A
Casefrr Transsexual Marriage Recognition, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 533, 546-554 (2006).
125. Id. at 555.
126. Id. at 565-66. Fletcher notes that:
a transsexual individual, even with a birth certificate indicating their identi-
fied sex, may still encounter legal issues in the courtroom. Absent a statute
or enforcement of an existing statute clearly allowing a transsexual's reas-
signed sex and/or court decisions recognizing a transsexual's reassigned sex,
transsexual marriage rights with respect to their identified sex will continue
to be nonexistent.
Id.
127. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 294; see also id. at 297-98 (listing state and federal stat-
utes that make this classification).
128. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
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male. Her original birth certificate, an official document of Texas, clearly
so states."'129 This analysis does not consider the plaintiff's own gender
identification as a woman, the surgical procedures she underwent, or the
change of her name or sex on her birth certificate.13° It also wiped clean
the couple's seven-year union, which the husband had entered into with
full knowledge of the plaintiff's sex reassignment surgery ten years ear-
lier."'
A minority judicial view allows for self-identification over birth sex
and recognizes the complex biological continuum between male and
female. This viewpoint was encapsulated nearly thirty years ago by a
New Jersey court in M. T v. J T.' The court validated a marriage be-
tween a man and a male-to-female transsexual. To reach this result, the
court had to markedly disagree with other courts which had concluded
that sex is "irrevocably cast at the moment of birth" and that biological
sex was the determining factor of marital capacity.'33 While recognizing
that a person could change their role in the male-female binary, the
court did not go as far as to recognize a third gender category. The
court's holding was limited: "for marital purposes if the anatomical or
genital features of a genuine transsexual are made to conform to the per-
son's gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity by sex must be
governed by the congruence of these standards."'34 This rule recognized
that the plaintiff should be considered female and therefore the marriage
was valid.'35
According to the M. T court, transsexual marriage required "con-
gruence" and a fixed role in the binary, even if that role had changed
since birth. This reasoning suggests that an intersexed person could en-
ter into a valid opposite-sex marriage as long as his or her external
genitals and gender identity were congruent. In the immigration con-
text, another court took a slightly broader view. The Board of
Immigration Appeals refused to accept the narrow definition proposed
by the Department of Homeland Security: to determine the validity of a
marriage by looking at the common meanings of the terms man and
woman as they are used in the Defense of Marriage Act.'36 In analyzing
the plaintiff's sex, the court acknowledged the complexity of biological
129. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
130. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
131. Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 227.
132. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
133. M. T, 355 A.2d at 209.
134. M. T, 355 A.2d at 209.
135. M.T, 355 A.2d at 211.




indicators of sex, citing the eight different factors used to determine sex
discussed in Julie Greenberg's article, and made an analogy to intersexed
individuals who lacked congruence in these factors.'37 The court vali-
dated the marriage of a male to a male-to-female transsexual under
North Carolina law'38 by looking at the petitioner's current birth certifi-
cate, which she had amended to designate herself as a female.'39
Judicial recognition that sex is more complicated than XX or XY
chromosomes is important to ensure intersexed people are not denied
the right to marry. Although still a minority view in the marriage con-
text, courts are beginning to recognize and protect biological complexity
in employment discrimination cases under Title VII.
2. Employment Discrimination
In the marriage cases discussed above, the majority judicial position
is that biological sex is a fixed male-female binary-a viewpoint that
denies basic human rights to intersexed people who fall outside the bi-
nary. In contrast, an emerging trend in Title VII employment
discrimination cases is a judicial recognition of biological complexities
underlying the male-female binary. Courts are more willing to protect
transsexual and intersexed individuals from discrimination in the work-
place while reluctant to grant affirmative rights in the marriage context.
Title VII makes it unlawful for any employer "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin."'4 ° Sex refers to biology and implicitly
137. Lova-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 752 (noting that medical experts use the following
factors to determine sex: (1) genetic or chromosomal sex; (2) gonadal sex; (3) internal
morphologic sex; (4) external morphologic sex; (5) hormonal sex; (6) phenotypic sex;
(7) assigned sex and gender of rearing; and (8) sexual identity). Greenberg's article
also influenced a Kansas court in validating a marriage between a man and a male-to-
female transsexual. See also In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App.
2001) (determining that a court should evaluate sex when the marriage license is ob-
tained and not at birth). However, this result was overturned by the Kansas Supreme
Court. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
138. The court emphasized that the law of the state where the couple celebrated the mar-
riage governed the issue and that regulation of marriage is an exclusive state matter.
Lova-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 751. Refusing to preempt state law with federal law,
even in the immigration context, will allow some states to recognize a broader con-
cept of marriage.
139. Lova-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 753.
140. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
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assumes that the plaintiff's sex will conform to the fixed male-female
binary.141 This definition leaves out two overlapping classes of people:
intersexed individuals whose biological sex determinants are ambiguous
or transsexuals who have or are in the process of transitioning from one
sex to another.
142
Recent court decisions suggest the judiciary is willing to complicate
Title VII's presumptions about sex in order to protect intersexed or
transsexuals from discrimination in the workplace. This represents a sig-
nificant shift from older cases, exemplified by the Seventh Circuit
opinion in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.143 Karen Ulane was a male-to-
female transsexual who worked as an airline pilot for Eastern Airlines
until she was discharged after sex reassignment surgery. "' 4 Her attorney
advocated that Eastern Airlines fired Ms. Ulane "for no reason other
than the fact that she ceased being a male and became a female.' ' 145 The
district court, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 146, held that Ms. Ulane
stated a Title VII claim because termination for being a transsexual was
discrimination "because of her sex." 147 The Seventh Circuit reversed and
held that Title VII does not protect transsexuals.'48 The Ulane II court,
reluctant to liberally interpret the statute, reasoned that "because of...
sex" should be limited to its plain meaning-"that it is unlawful to dis-
criminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men.149
Five years later, the sex stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins5 ° opened the door to a new approach that would circumvent
cases such as Ulane II. Price Waterhouse held that employers should not
evaluate employees to see if their behavior and appearance match socie-
141. Zachary A. Kramer, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Title VII's Intersexions, 7 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 31, 37 (2006).
142. Id.
143. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) cert denied 471 U.S. 1917 (1985) [hereinafter Ulane
fl].
144. Ulane II, 742 F.2d. at 1082-84.
145. Ulane II, 742 F.2dat 1082.
146. 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983) rev'd742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
Ulane 1].
147. Ulane1, 581 F. Supp. at 827.
148. Ulane II, 742 F.2dat 1087.
149. Ulane II, 742 F.2d at 1085. The court also noted that "[t]he total lack of legislative
history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the circumstances of the
amendment's adoption clearly indicates that Congress never considered nor intended
that this 1964 legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex."
Ulane I, 742 F.2d at 1085.
150. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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tal stereotypes as to male and female roles."' The plaintiff, Ann
Hopkins, alleged that the Price Waterhouse firm had discriminated
against her because of sex when considering whether she would be pro-
moted to partner.'5 2 While Ms. Hopkins' clients were extremely pleased
with her work, the firm found her too abrasive and lacking interpersonal
skills.' In short, the firm reacted negatively to her brusque personality
because she was a woman. One decision maker advised that in order to
improve her chances to make partner, Ms. Hopkins should "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'54 The Supreme Court found
these remarks to be impermissible considerations in an employment de-
cision.
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit decision in Ulane II, the Su-
preme Court interpreted Title VII more broadly by focusing on its
remedial purpose. The Court concluded that:
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive,
or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender ....
... [W]e are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group, for "'[fi]n forbid-
ding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.
It was not long before transsexual employees latched onto the sex
stereotyping theory as an end run around Ulane I. 156 Despite the fact that
the federal courts of appeals have not agreed on how to resolve the tension
between Ulane II and Price Waterhouse, Price Waterhouse represents the
151. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51.
152. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231-32.
153. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
154. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
155. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51 (citations omitted).
156. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D. D.C. 2006) ("[A] number of
other courts have abandoned Ulane after Price Waterhouse [sic] and ruled that Title
VII protects transsexuals who do not conform to their employers' gender stereo-
types.").
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possibility of unlocking the gender binary and protecting transsexuals
and intersexed from discrimination in the workplace.
Courts applying Price Waterhouse to sex stereotyping claims by
transsexuals follow three paths. Courts in the Fifth'57 and Tenth'58 Cir-
cuits still view Ulane II as controlling and hold that transsexuals are not
protected by Title VII. Courts in the Third,'59 Sixth, 6 and Ninth 61 Cir-
cuits find that Price Waterhouse controls and permits recovery for
transsexuals who can properly plead a sex stereotyping theory. A court in
the D.C. Circuit 62 seems to tread a middle approach-not finding Price
Waterhouse a satisfying theory yet seeking to recognize biological com-
plexity and discrimination against non-conforming individuals. This
third position is the best option because it recognizes the biological
complexities long recognized in the medical community: that male and
female are not exclusive categories.
These three approaches diverge on three key issues. First, how to
read the congressional intent of Title VII's "because of sex" requirement.
Second, whether transsexuals challenge the gender binary or conform to
the binary by changing their gender. Third, what discrimination counts
as sex stereotyping and what are universally accepted gender norms. To
illustrate the third category, I explore an example that I have termed the
"bathroom dilemma," which illustrates the challenges presented by sex-
segregated bathrooms to individuals who are not clearly male or fe-
male. 163
157. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *19-
27 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
158. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 04-cv-616, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *8-
10 (D. Ut. June 24, 2005).
159. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2001);
Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. 05-243, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6521, at
*4-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006).
160. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005) cert. denied 126 S.
Ct. 624 (2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571-75 (6th Cir. 2004); Doe
v. United Consumer Fin. Serv., No. 1:01-cv-1112, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25509, at
*12 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001). But the Sixth Circuit only goes so far in protecting
transsexuals under Title VII. See Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996,
999-1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that Title VII did not protect a transsexual
plaintiff who failed to conform to generally accepted principles of sex segregated pub-
lic bathrooms) affd 98 Fed. App'x 461 (6th Cir. 2004).
161. Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll., No. 02-1531, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29825,
at *8 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004).
162. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. D.C. 2006).
163. Author Terry Kogan has also explored the negative impact of sex-segregated bath-
rooms on transgendered and intersexed individuals. See generally Terry S. Kogan, Sex-
Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER &
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Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.'64 is an example of strict judicial
interpretation of Title VII. The court found that Title VII did not pro-
tect a transvestite plaintiff, Peter Oiler, who cross-dressed as a woman in
public (but never while working as a truck driver for his employer
Winn-Dixie) one to three times a month in order to express his femi-
nine side and relieve stress.1 65 Winn-Dixie fired Mr. Oiler because they
feared that customers would recognize him while he was cross-dressed in
public, disapprove of his lifestyle, and shop elsewhere.166 Agreeing with
the viewpoint of Ulane II, the court found that this action did not vio-
late Title VII, interpreting "because of sex" to mean biological sex,
which does not include sexual identity or gender identity disorders. 6 As
further support for this proposition, the court noted that thirty-one
proposed bills to amend Title VII to include discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation had failed.168 Further, the court distinguished Price
Waterhouse by finding:
[T]hat this is not a situation where the plaintiff failed to con-
form to a gender stereotype. Plaintiff was not discharged
because he did not act sufficiently masculine or because he ex-
hibited traits normally valued in a female employee, but
disparaged in a male employee. Rather the plaintiff disguised
himself as a ... female for stress relief .... 169
Another federal court expressed its fear that the male-female binary
must be enforced more blatantly. In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority,7'
the plaintiff, Krystal Sandoval Etsitty, was a pre-operative transsexual
who still had male genitalia but was taking female hormones that
changed her outward appearance. In other words, the plaintiff, just like
an intersexed person, occupied a biological space "in-between" male and
female. The defendant, the Utah Transit Authority, fired Ms. Etsitty af-
ter she told her supervisor that she would be appearing as a female at
work and personnel became concerned that she would use a female
L. 1, 56 (2007); Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possi-
bility ofa Restroom Labeled "Other", 48 Hastings L.J. 1223, 1248 (1997).
164. No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
165. Oiler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at * 5-7.
166. Oiler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *9-10.
167. Oiler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *30. Yet, no Congressperson has introduced
a bill that addresses whether Title VII should prohibit discrimination based on sexual
identity. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D. D.C. 2006).
168. Oiler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *22-23.
169. Oiler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *28.
170. No. 2:04CV616, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *1-2 (D. Utah June 24, 2005).
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bathroom even though she was a biological male.17' This problem con-
cerned the defendant because transit operators must use public
restrooms along their routes and the defendant felt it would be imprac-
tical to arrange for a unisex bathroom.
17 2
While noting the tension between Ulane II and Price Waterhouse,
the court held that transsexuals are not protected under Title VII absent
a Congressional mandate.17 The court reasoned that Title VII does not
call for a complete rejection of sex-related conventions and expressed
fear that "if something as drastic as a man's attempt to dress and appear
as a woman is simply a failure to conform to the male stereotype, and
nothing more, then there is no social custom or practice associated with
a particular sex that is not a stereotype.'1 74 The court ruled that Ms. Et-
sitty failed to state a claim under Price Waterhouse's sex stereotyping
theory. The Utah Transit Authority did not require Ms. Etsitty to con-
form to gender appearance stereotypes but only "to conform to the





In reaching this conclusion, the court seems to reach outside the record
of the case and rule based on presumed societal mores. Ms. Etsitty ar-
gued that defendant's concern over restroom usage was pretextual
because no one had complained to the defendant and the defendant had
not even attempted to investigate reasonable alternatives. The court
found that no studies were necessary to determine that "[c]oncerns
about privacy, safety and propriety are the reason that gender[-]specific
restrooms are universally accepted in our society.' 77 By allowing an em-
ployer to hide behind the bathroom dilemma without proving it was an
actual problem, the court reinforced societal stereotypes instead of ques-
tioning them.
Other courts have been more willing to use Price Waterhouse to pro-
tect noncomforming individuals. Smith v. City of Salem178 provided an
opportunity for the Sixth Circuit to extend the protection of Title VII to
a transsexual because the facts closely mirrored Price Waterhouse. Jimmie
Smith, a transsexual employee of the fire department, began expressing a
more feminine appearance at work and his co-workers commented "that
his appearance and mannerisms were not 'masculine enough."' 79 The
171. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *3-4.
172. Etsity, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *4.
173. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *8-10.
174. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *14-15.
175. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *16 (citations omitted).
176. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *17.
177. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at*18.
178. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
179. Smith, 378 F.3d. at 568.
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court overruled the district court, which had followed Ulane II in hold-
ing that Title VII does not protect transsexuals. It instead read Price
Waterhouse as expanding Title VII's protections not only to sex discrimi-
nation but to gender discrimination, which it defined as "discrimination
based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms."180
Even though the Sixth Circuit expanded its definition of sex stereo-
typing to protect transsexuals, what counts as sex stereotyping is
construed rather narrowly. Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc. 181 is a good indica-
tor of the complex legal problems an intersexed plaintiff will face when
challenging the gender binary at work. The plaintiff, Selena Johnson,
worked at a Fresh Mark, a meat packing plant.182 Although she was des-
ignated as a male at birth after a "cursory genital examination," she
began living as a female when she was a teenager."3 After employees
complained that Ms. Johnson used both the male and female restrooms,
Fresh Mark told Ms. Johnson that she was required to use the male rest-
room because her state-issued driver's license identified her as male.8
Ms. Johnson refused to work under this command because she feared
for her own safety. Fresh Mark subsequently fired her for missing
work.185 The court found that Ms. Johnson did not have a Price Water-
house sex stereotyping claim under Title VII because "Fresh Mark did
not require Plaintiff to conform her appearance to a particular gender
stereotype, instead, the company only required Plaintiff to conform to
the accepted principles established for gender-distinct public rest-
,,186
rooms.
One federal court has recognized that making individuals with non-
conforming genitalia conform to the sex binary in choosing a restroom at
work can lay the basis for a Title VII claim.8 7 Transsexual plaintiff,
180. Smith, 378 F.3d. at 573.
181. 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
182. Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
183. Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 998. The plaintiff posited that she may be intersexed but
the court refused to consider whether there was a distinction between transsexualism
and intersexuality since the plaintiff merely hypothesized about this alternative. John-
son, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1000. Then, the court proceeded to chastise the plaintiff for
failing to divulge her intersexed condition to the company as a "congenital abnormal-
ity." Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
184. Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
185. Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
186. Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
187. Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29825, at *10 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2004) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim) [hereinafter Kast 1]. However, plaintiff's claim failed to sur-
vive the more stringent summary judgment standard. This may be because plaintiff's
attorney did not provide an adequate evidentiary record and poorly framed the issues
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Rebecca Kastl, was designated as a male at birth but began living as a
woman and legally changed her name and driver's license to match her
female gender identity.' 88 Ms. Kastl continued to work as an adjunct
faculty member at Maricopa County Community College during the
time period when she transitioned from male to female. 89 The college
required Ms. Kastl and another transsexual to use the men's restroom
until they had completed sex reassignment surgery.19° Plaintiff refused to
follow this policy and the college fired her.'9' In denying the defendant's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court
recognized that being a biological female yet possessing male genitalia
are not mutually exclusive because "[m]edical evidence suggests that the
appearance of genitals at birth is not always consistent with other indica-
tors of sex . . ,,192 For this reason, Ms. Kastl's claim survived a motion
to dismiss because "to create restrooms for each sex but to require a
woman to use the men's restroom if she fails to conform to the em-
ployer's expectations regarding a woman's behavior or anatomy, or to
require her to prove her conformity with those expectations, violates
Title VII."' The Kastl I court was one of the first to recognize that in-
dividuals with nonconforming genitalia should not be deprived of
employment benefits and that this rule could not be "avoided merely
because restroom availability is the benefit at issue."' 94
One court in the D.C. Circuit has confronted the tension between
Ulane II and Price Waterhouse head on by suggesting that it is time for
the law to recognize the biological complexities identified by the medi-
cal community-in short, to return to the district court's opinion in
for litigation. See Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) (granting summary judgment for
defendant) [hereinafter Kasti II]. The court struck several of plaintiffs evidentiary fil-
ings as untimely. Kastl II, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *9-11. The court also
ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish aprimafacie case that she was a member of a
protected class (a biological female) because she failed to support her theory that there
were other determinants of biological sex other than genitalia, hormones, and chro-
mosomes. Kasd II, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at "16-20. Plaintiff also failed to
challenge defendant's policy of segregating bathrooms by sex. Kasd I, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *20. Despite this later ruling that ultimately dismissed plain-
tiffs claim, the court's earlier opinion is still a novel legal recognition of the potential
expansiveness of Price Waterhouse's sex stereotyping theory.
188. KastII, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *3.
189. KastlII, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *4.
190. KastlII, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *4
191. KasdII, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *4
192. KastlI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29825, at *7 n.5.
193. KaslI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29825, at *10.
194. KastlI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29825, at *9.
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Ulane I. In Schroer v. Billington,' the Congressional Research Service of
the Library of Congress offered to employ plaintiff Diane Schroer, a
male-to-female transsexual. Schroer, who had interviewed for the posi-
tion as a male, had her offer of employment rescinded once she
informed the Library that she would be reporting to work as a female.'96
This employment decision provides a striking factual example reminis-
cent of Ulane: an employer hires a male employee and decides to fire
that employee when she becomes a female. The court held that Price
Waterhouse's sex stereotyping did not protect Ms. Schroer because that
theory "creates space for people of both sexes to express their sexual
identity in non-conforming ways" and Ms. Schroer "does not wish to go
against the gender grain, but with it" because "[s]he seeks to express her
female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a woman."'97 The crux
of Ms. Schroer's employment problems, according to the court, is that
her employer is intolerant of individuals whose gender identity does not
match his or her biological sex and this could not be remedied under
Price Waterhouse's sex stereotyping theory.'98
The court returned to the reasoning of the district court's decision
in Ulane I, which recognized that "sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of
chromosomes . . . [but] encompasses sexual identity" and is protected by
Title VII." The court extrapolated that the Seventh Circuit's reason for
overturning the district court's decision no longer held weight because
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, such as protecting male-on-male
sexual harassment in the workplace, applied Title VII in ways that were
never contemplated by Congress. 00 The court proposed a new rule that
would protect transsexuals under Title VII:
[D]iscrimination against transsexuals because they are trans-
sexuals is 'literally' discrimination 'because of... sex.' [This]
approach ... [is] a straightforward way to deal with the factual
complexities that underlie human sexual identity. These com-
plexities stem from real variations in how the different
components of biological sexuality-chromosomal, gonadal,
hormonal, and neurological-interact with each other, and in
195. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. D.C. 2006).
196. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06.
197. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d. at 210-11.
198. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d. at 211.
199. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d. at 211 (citations omitted).
200. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d. at 212 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523
U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
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turn, with social, psychological and legal conceptions of gen-
der.
201
In support of this rule, the court describes intersexed conditions
and further suggests that: "[d]iscrimination against such women . . . be-
cause they have testes and XY chromosomes, or against any other person
because of an intersexed condition, cannot be anything other than 'lit-
eral[ ]' discrimination 'because of... sex.' 
,202
After more than thirty years, it is time to return to the reasoning of
Ulane I instead of contorting the sex stereotyping theory of Price Water-
house. It is time for the law to recognize biological complexity and
protect nonconforming individuals from discrimination because they
challenge the notion of a fixed gender binary. This may be the civil
rights struggle of our century, as the Ulane I court suggested when re-
sponding to Eastern Airlines's argument that allowing a transsexual in
the cockpit would lead the public to question the safety of airline travel.
The court stated:
This is the kind of argument that opponents of civil rights liti-
gation urged back in those long-ago days when we did not
have anti-discrimination laws. We cannot serve blacks in this
restaurant. Nobody will come in. We cannot employ a black
to drive this bus. Nobody will ride the bus. We sure can't have
any blacks carry the mail or work in a department store. We
will lose customers. Well, the American public is a lot smarter
than the bigots gave them credit for being, and those predic-
tions did not prove to be true. I am old enough to remember
when there were no blacks driving buses in Chicago or virtu-
ally none, no black sales clerks in department stores, no black
mail carriers. We all know the extent to which those jobs have
been opened up to persons of all races and sexes and how
much better a society it has made us and how the insuperable
problems that were supposed to come about just did not hap-
pen. The same thing is going to happen should Karen Ulane
resume her seat in the cockpit .... .0'
201. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d. at 212-13 (emphasis in original).
202. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d. at 213 n.5 (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F.
Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. I11. 1983)).
203. Ulane I, 581 F. Supp. at 832. By delivering his opinion in open court, Judge Grady's
statement takes on an urgent tone.
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The court's parade of horribles mocks the "legitimate" reasons em-
ployers give for firing plaintiffs who challenge the gender binary. In
hindsight, these reasons for not affording civil rights to blacks seem ri-
diculous, and they are no more believable as a basis for denying rights to
transsexuals and the intersexed. These employment discrimination cases
show an emerging trend of broadening statutory definitions to match
the medical reality that some individuals do not neatly fall into one of
two boxes labeled "male" and "female."
CONCLUSION
Why require birth certificates to designate children as male or fe-
male unless the purpose is to facilitate legal classifications on the basis of
sex? A sizeable group-one to four percent-of the world's population,
cannot be categorized as fully male or female. Individuals who live out-
side this sex binary face potential human rights abuses. Intersexed
infants in the United States are surgically altered to fit into this binary,
and the hijras in India, who embrace a third gender identity, continue to
battle societal discrimination. Legislators and courts will need to address
this collision.
One path is through statutory reform to recognize the right to self-
identify as a third gender. The broad judicial interpretations of Title VII
should be codified to match the growing medical awareness of the com-
plex varieties of biological sex and gender identity. Statutory provisions
such as the federal DOMA and REAL ID Acts, which curtail the right
to marry or limit state identification documents based on a view of sex
as a fixed binary, should be repealed. These statutory changes could raise
awareness of intersex status, such as the "E" passport designation in In-
dia has done.
There is a model for such statutory reform: the International Bill of
Gender Rights (IBGR).24 This bill has not yet been enacted as binding
law in any jurisdiction.205 Drafted in 1993 and adopted in 1995 by the
International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy,
the IBGR grants ten rights, beginning with the right to define gender
identity. The bill expresses the viewpoint that gender is "ever-unfolding"
and therefore:
204. Frye, supra note 7, app. B.
205. Attempts to introduce an Equal Opportunity (Sexuality and Gender Identity
Discrimination) Bill in Australia failed. See Australian Democrats, http://
www.democrats.org.au/campaigns/sexuality (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
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[A]ll human beings have the right to define their own gender
identity regardless of chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned
birth sex, or initial gender role, and further, no individual shall
be denied Human or Civil Rights by virtue of a self-defined
gender identity which is not in accord with chromosomal sex,
genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role.206
The bill additionally guarantees the right to secure and retain em-
ployment; the right to control and change one's body to express self-
defined gender identity; the right to competent medical care when
changing one's body; the right to enter into marriage contracts regardless
of an individual's or an individual's partner's assigned birth sex; and the
right to conceive, bear, or adopt children. 7
While the sweeping IBGR may not be enacted anywhere in the
near future, it is inspiring local governments to enact laws that will pro-
tect intersexed people. For this reason, federal legislation such as the
federal DOMA and REAL ID Acts is particularly troubling, since it bars
state and local governments from granting expansive protection. In
1995, San Francisco recognized "gender identity" as a protected class in
its nondiscrimination ordinance, targeted at accommodating all indi-
viduals and prohibiting gender discrimination in employment, housing,
and public facilities.2 8 In the introduction to the ordinance, the drafters
state that "a person's gender identity is that person's sense of self regard-
ing characteristics labeled as masculine, feminine, both or neither. An
individual determines their own gender identity and the sole proof of a
person's gender identity is that person's statement or expression of their
self identification. '"20 9 This view, which validates an individual's self-
gender identity and recognizes a gender identity beyond the male-female
binary, will protect intersexed individuals.
Statutory reform in the United States can be an immediate remedy
while advocates begin building a constitutional right210 to self-identify
206. Frye, supra note 7, app. B at 212.
207. Id, app. B.
208. SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES TO PROHIBIT
GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION (Dec. 10, 2003), available at hrtp://
ww.ci.sf.ca.us/site/sfhumanrights page.asp?id=627 4 .
209. Id.
210. Some plaintiffs have also advanced federal First Amendment claims arguing that they
have a protected right to express their unique gender identity. Thus far, these claims
have been unsuccessful. Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29825 at *31-33 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2004) (ruling that Plain-
tiff's First Amendment claim survives a motion to dismiss) overruled by Kastl v.
Maricopa County Cmty. Coll., No. 02-1531, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60267, at *25-
26 (D. Az. Aug. 22, 2006); Doe v. Yunits, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491 at *17
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outside the gender binary based on the fundamental right to privacy and
bodily integrity derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 1' In the last forty years, the Court has expanded the right to
privacy to include the right to obtain contraceptives212 and abortions213
and most recently, to protect private, consensual homosexual conduct
from intrusion by the state.1 4 With each expansion of the right beyond
the traditional family (a married, heterosexual couple), the right to pri-
vacy is positioned to challenge compulsory participation in the male-
female binary.
This right to liberty makes explicit "a promise of the Constitution
that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter."215 Moreover, the Court has emphasized that:
[T]he most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (finding that plaintiff may be able to prove a liberty
interest in her appearance) overruled by Doe v. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rep. 278 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2001).
211. Fourteenth Amendment protection of the intersexed has been suggested by other
authors. See generally Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing
Fundamental Rights for the Intersexed, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 31 (2005); Chai
R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One's Own Concept of Existence: What Lawrence Can
Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEo. J. GENDER & L. 115 (2006).
Feldblum's article points out a core problem in this approach: the traditional view
that the Fourteenth Amendment only provides a "negative right"-that is, one that
prohibits government intrusion or differential treatment but not one that requires the
granting of affirmative rights such as marriage. See Feldblum at 127. Feldblum sug-
gests
if the particular tilt at issue is related to a person's core, essential self-
definition, then the government has a constitutional obligation to rectify
any tilt created by background social norms. An individual's choice to
marry, to have (or not to have) a child, to engage in satisfying sexual inti-
macy, or to live in the gender that matches his/her sense of identity all
relate to a person's core, essential self-definition. In these areas, the Consti-
tution places on the State not only a negative obligation not to criminalize
the conduct or status in question, but concomitantly, a positive obligation
to rectify tilts created by society for those individuals who are seeking to
live their authentic selves.
Id. at 130.
212. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 470 (1965) (striking down law banning the dis-
tribution of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (expanding
Griswold to unmarried individuals).
213. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973.
214. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
215. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 847).
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Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed un-
der compulsion of the State.'
6
What is closer to the "heart of liberty" and more "central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy" than an individual's chosen gender
identity-to be granted full legal rights and protection against discrimi-
nation even if one does not fall into one of two neat societal boxes
labeled male or female." 7 Undoubtedly, the right to identify beyond the
fixed male-female gender binary should not be tainted by state compul-
sion.
The societal belief that sex is a male-female binary fixed at birth
leads to human rights abuses for individuals, particularly males, who do
not conform to this model, whether this nonconformity is caused by
biology, as for intersexed infants in the United States, or choice and bi-
ology, as for the hijras in India. To end the discrimination caused by this
expectation, countries should allow for self-identification as male, fe-
male, or a third gender. t
216. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
217. One court has recognized that requiring proof of sex before being allowed to use
bathrooms segregated by sex could implicate the fundamental right to privacy. Kastl
v. Maricopa County Cmty. College Dist., No. 02-1531, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29825 at *19-23 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2004).
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